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Case No. 930384-CA 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JULIE RIMENSBURGER, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
JOSEPH RIMENSBURGER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(i)(1992). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether Defendant/Appellant, who, having been granted specific relief on 
Appeal is now entitled to an award of more than what was specifically granted to 
him by this Court's Order as interpreted by the District Court. 
The relief granted Defendant was specifically set forth by this Court in it's 
second amended unpublished opinion entered by this Court on the 6th day of 
November 1992. The Court's specific language is as follows: 
We therefore otder Wife's attorney to pay Husband only for those 
reasonable expenses and attorney fees incurred up to June 20, 1991, 
the date the Trial Court entered its Order denying Husband's motion 
to dismiss, but not for those fees and expenses incurred thereafter. 
STATEMENT OF CASF 
Defendant's appeal from an Order of the Thiid District Court prevailed in 
this Court on the iss* 3 of jurisdiction. However, the original Order of the Court 
was amended twice with J^e fin^1 opinion being issued November 6, 1992. 
Although the issue of jurisdiction which was before the Court was never modified, 
this Court entered two (2) modifications of its award of expenses and fees to 
Defendant, each amended Order reducing the award of expenses and fees. After 
the second amended Order, the case was remanded to the District Court with 
instruction to a) dismiss Plaintiff's Petition for Modification, and b) award 
Defendant his reasonable expenses and attorney fees incurred up to June 20, 1991, 
but denying Defendant any expenses or attorney fees which he incurred after June 
20, 1991. There was no language in the final Order either awarding Defendant 
hio costs or denying an award of those costs to Defendant. 
Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion with the District Court for an Order 
awarding him his reasonable attorney fee% expenses and costs. Both parties filed 
memoranda in support of their positions. The District Court, Judge Wilkinson 
2 
presiding, awarded Defendant expenses arid attorney fees for all of the work done 
by Defendant's attorney not only up to June 20, 1991, but for an additional one-
half (1/2) hour which Defendant's attorney spent after June 20, 1991, in preparing 
written Orders reflecting the Court's Order entered June 20, 1991. Judge 
Wilkinson awarded Defendant his entire request for attorneys fees in spite of the 
fact that the issue of jurisdiction was only a part of the total task Defendant's 
attorney had in responding to Plaintiff's Petition to Modify. Judge Wilkinson then 
denied Defendant's request for costs on appeal of some $197.00. His denial of 
any award of Defendant's costs was based on the fact that this Court was silent as 
to the issue of costs in this Court's Order of November 6, 1992. From that denial 
of costs, Defendant has brought the current appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts as stated by Defendant are essentially correct. After receiving 
Defendant's motion for the award of expenses, attorney fees and costs, the Third 
District Court, Judge Wilkinson, interpreted this Court's second amended Order 
of November 6, 1992, awarding expenses and attorney fees, but denying 
Defendant's request for costs because the language of this Court's specific Order 
was silent as to whether costs should be awarded or not. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Whether Defendant was or was not entitled to an award of his costs on 
appeal is a matter based on the intent of this Court at the time it entered it's Order 
of November 6, 1992, and of whether or not Judge Wilkinson correctly interpreted 
that Order. In either case, the confusion will easily be resolved by a simple 
clarification of that point by this Court. 
POINT II 
Plaintiffs attorney did not violate Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and Defendant is not entitled to an award of attorney fees as requested. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Rule 34(a) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure is as follows: 
Rule 34. Award of costs. 
(a) To whom allowed. Except as otherwise provided by law, 
if an appeal J > dismissed, costs shall be taxed against the appellant 
unless otherwise agreed by the parties or ordered by the court; if a 
judgment or order is affirmed, costs shall be taxed against appellant 
unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or order is reversed, costs 
shall be taxed against the appellee unless otherwise ordered; if a 
judgment or order is affirmed or reversed in part, or is vacated, costs 
shall be allowed as ordered by the court. Costs shall not be allowed 
or taxed in a criminal case. (Emphasis added) 
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While Rule 34 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure appears clear i c ises 
where the Court has reversed a lower Court's Judgment or Order, it alsc n ikes 
provision in the second to the last sentence of that rule that where a Judgn ent has 
been modified or reversed in part, costs shall be allowed only as ordi re b / the 
Court. 
While the original Judgment of the District Court on the issue of jurisdiction 
was reversed, the Order of this Court, with respect to the award of expenses and 
attorney fees, was modified twice. Such a modification has the effect of requiring 
this Court to specifically award costs on appeal. 
The possibility of confusion with respect to the applicability of the various 
provisions of Rule 34 coupled with the rather specific language of this Court's 
Order of November 6, 1992, which denied fees and expenses incurred after June 
20, 1991, and the fact that the November Order was silent as to the issue of costs 
apparently led to Judge Wilkinson's order denying Defendant his costs. 
Due to the cut off date for the award of expenses and fees listed in this 
Court's Order, Judge Wilkinson could reasonably have interpreted that to limit all 
costs, fees and expenses unless specifically awarded. 
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t is clear that w hether or not Judge Wilkinson interpreted this Court's Order 
propei y ir improperly the intent of this Court can and will be made clear by this 
Court. 
POINT II 
Plaintiff's argument to (he Trial Court with respect to the issue of costs on 
appeal is sustainable on at least two (2) grounds. First, the language of Rule 34 
in the last phrase of the first sentence it states "If a Judgment or Order is affirmed 
or reversed in part, or is vacated, costs shall be allowed as ordered by the Court". 
While it is true that the issue on appeal was not reversed in part, the portion of the 
Court's Order with respect to the award of attorneys fees awaided to Defendant 
was reversed and modified twice. Such a modification of the Court's Order could 
reasonably lead to a requirement that an award of costs should have been 
specifically stated in the Court's Order. 
Secondly, the specific cut off date with respect to the award of attorneys fees 
and expenses could also reasonably have been interpreted to prohibit the Trial 
Court from awarding costs on appeal which were most certainly incurred following 
the cut off date stated in the Order. 
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Plaintiffs counsel did not violate Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure by suggesting reasonable alternatives for the Court's consideration in 
the interpretation of this Court's Order which was silent as to the issue of costs on 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The issue of Judge Wilkinson's interpretation of Rule 34 and/or of his 
interpretation of this Court's Order of November 6, 1992, is a matter that will be 
resolved by this Court making it's intentions clear as to the award of costs an 
appeal in the previous appeal. 
Defendant's request for sanctions against Plaintiff and/or Plaintiffs attorney 
are improper for the reason that Plaintiffs arguments to the Court were reasonable 
and not a per se violation of Rule 11. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Lynn JT Qark- /( 
Attorney ror Plaintiff/Appellee 
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CERTIFIC VTE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the Z?tf Tlay of January, 1994, two (2) true and 
correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Mr. Wendell P. Abies, Attorney for Defendant/Appel' mt, 536 East 400 South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
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Thiro Judicial District 
W e n d e l l P . A b i e s , Bar No. 11 
Attorney for Defendant MAY 1 1 1993 
536 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 i-*.rLs»^ puNTY 
Telephone: (801) 532-7424 3y m 
FINDINGS AND ORDER 
Civil No. 915900078MI 
Judge Homer F, Wilkinson 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JULIE RIMENSBURGER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSEPH RIMENSBURGER, 
Defendant. 
Defendant's Motion for an Award of Attorney's Fees along 
with payment of a cost bill was submitted to the Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson for decision pursuant to Rule 4-501, Code of Judicial 
Administration, and the court being fully advised in the premises, 
now makes and enters the following findings: 
FINDINGS 
1. That the hourly rate, amount of fees and preparing a 
court order of June 20, 1991 after that date is a proper charge. 
2. The court of appeals was silent in the awarding of 
cost of appeal against the Plaintiff and therefore this court will 
leave the matter for the Court of Appeals. 
ORDER 
NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED: 
1. That Defendant is awarded a judgment against 
Plaintiff for attorney's fees in the sum of $487.50. 
2. Costs on appeal are hereby denied. 
Dated this /' day of April, 1993. 
/HOMER F. WILKINSON 
/ District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the *ut^ day of April, 1993, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice to Submit for 
Decision was mailed, postage prepaid, to Lynn J. Clark, Attorney 
for Plaintiff, 935 East South Union Avenue, Suite D-102, Midvale, 
Utah 84047. 
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